[jdev] Re: TLS and self-signed certs
jconley at winfessor.com
Thu Nov 18 11:33:05 CST 2004
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Matthias Wimmer [mailto:m at tthias.net]
> Hi JD!
> JD Conley schrieb am 2004-11-12 09:18:46:
> > > Not sure ... there are valid reasons to change your s2s
> > >
> > > - Key expired
> > > - Key has been compromised
> > > - Key has been lost
> > >
> > Well, if the cert changed you could then "verify" the key again with
> > dialback and reset the cache if you got the same response from the
> > dialback authority.
> Allowing dialback to verify new certificates ... I don't think that
> will improve security. It can't be harder than dialback, as an
> can always force you to use dialback again (presenting a new
> certificate) ... The only thing that changes is, that you get a second
> change to take over a host: You get the known certificate of a server.
> So I guess using this approach would be even weaker than pure
Obviously the attacker would get the public certificate of the server
they're connecting to. I don't see how having that information is a
chance to take over a host.
If an attacker attempts to connect and provides a certificate that is
not on record for the host they are claiming to be, a dialback is
performed against the authority of the host. The attacker, unless they
have control of DNS or the other host's network, is then rejected as the
dialback authority would produce a certificate that is not the same as
> Having a trusted body like the JSF, that acts as a registry/CA might
> a solution and I am looking forward to see Peter's proposal ... the
> remaining problem might be to verify if someone is allowed to apply
> a certificate.
At this point, I'd rather use dialback on the public internet and let
administrators choose which CA's they want to trust. Most of the time
CA's are going to be intranet or extranet CA's. Some may choose to
trust the "default" trusted set so a VeriSign cert would work, for
example. But in the end, with dialback in place, you don't need CA
based certificates unless you're setting up a very specific trust
network. This is much more user friendly and fairly secure (at least as
much as you can trust someone on the internet with no real liability to
properly manage a CA).
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