[Operators] Administering of MUC

Marco Cirillo maranda at lightwitch.org
Mon May 28 13:22:33 UTC 2012

Il 28/05/2012 11:31, Mathias Ertl ha scritto:
> Hi,
> On 2012-05-28 00:19, Peter Viskup wrote:
>> we are experiencing some strange situation on MUC on our jabber server.
>> There were quite a lot of MUC created and most of them from Syria. These
>> MUCs were moved from other jabber server on which they were blocked.
>> Does somebody of you have experience with bots flooding MUCs and users
>> asking for granting them admin rights for specific MUCs? How do you
>> 'clean' persistent MUCs not used anymore?
>> Main issues:
>>   - listing of registered conferences take some minutes
>>   - muc_room Mnesia table is about 58MBs large
>>   - ejabberdctl doesn't provide commands for administering MUCs
> We (jabber.at) have the very same problem. Two things are important to note:
> 1. These rooms are created en masse automatically. If you destroy them
> all,>100 will be created within a few seconds. (but that does not occur
> until some time after that)
> 2. While much of it appears to come from Syria (i.e. Room names are
> those of Syrian cities) no *real* chat is happening there. I have given
> chatlogs to a few arab-speaking persons and the "chat" is just
> gibberish. I have tried several times to chat with MUC-admins and their
> intelligence has been similar to that of Eliza[1].
> We have taken some steps to stop that epidemic:
> (1) Only local users may create MUCs.
> When MUCs are created, the creator is usually the same over all rooms.
> because of (1), we know what IP registered and used that acccount.
> (2) All accounts registered/used from that IP-address are deleted,
> usernames blocked, IP-addresses blocked on an IP-Level.
> (3) We use a munin-plugin[2] to monitor the number of MUCs. If a large
> number of MUCs is created, we get a notification by Munin.
> Using these measures, this now only happens rarely. If it happens, MUCs
> are removed very fast by our admins.
> Another thing to note: The first time I started destroying MUCs using my
> regular account, I received a DOS-attack in the form of thousands of
> automated private messages. I now use a dedicated account that I can
> just log of from to destroy MUCs, as a precaution.
> greetings, Mati
> (jabber.at)
> [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA
> [2] http://git.fsinf.at/fsinf/munin/blobs/master/muc_count
Or better replace IBR (since xep-158 support in clients is about 
unexistant) with an appropriate safe OOB method. That leaves only s2s as 
the possible threat source, then begin identifying remote rogue services 
(probably still a server with IBR enabled) and aggressively filter 'em. 
Problem 1000% solved, with the most ease.

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