[Security] TLS Certificates Verification

Peter Saint-Andre stpeter at stpeter.im
Tue Aug 19 16:30:11 CDT 2008


Justin Karneges wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 August 2008 12:06:50 Jonathan Dickinson wrote:
>> Very good point Justin. Even if we implement SRP chances are that you could
>> get a few lazy developers that don't quit on the documented failure points.
>> Something simple to implement (I am going to read up on OTR now :)) may be
>> a good solution.
> 
> No, no.  To be clear, I'm not recommending OTR.  I'm sure Ian Goldberg is a 
> great guy, but OTR hasn't been put through the wringer like TLS has been.
> 
> OTR was invented for the deniability feature.  However, I argue that OTR is 
> popular today due to its usability, not due to deniability (or any of its 
> security features for that matter).  Ian wanted deniability and hassle-free 
> crypto, but the users of the world really only wanted hassle-free crypto.  
> OTR therefore meets the needs of the users, but the fact is, the users didn't 
> need a brand new protocol in order for their needs to be met.  OTR could just 
> as well have been based on TLS instead of its own protocol, and it would have 
> been just as popular.

Agreed.

I also assert that deniability is not necessarily desirable (it depends 
on the requirements for the system under consideration, and I've talked 
to "customers" of XMPP who positively cannot have deniability). I also 
assert that cryptographic deniability is useless in the real world 
anyway, but that's a separate topic.

/psa

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