[Security] TLS Certificates Verification

Justin Karneges justin at affinix.com
Wed Aug 20 13:28:33 CDT 2008

On Wednesday 20 August 2008 10:53:36 Dave Cridland wrote:
> On Wed Aug 20 18:43:32 2008, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> > And that's not even to get into the Layer 8 issues of what the IETF
> > security mafia might find acceptable -- RFC 3921 requires support
> > for RFC 3923 and we need to substitute something reasonable for
> > that ugly ugly S/MIME stuff that no one has ever implemented and no
> > one ever will.
> Hmmm... Now probably not a good time to mention that we probably
> *will* need to have a per-stanza signing (and possible encrypting)
> spec in some cases, too. Luckily, these are all specialist cases,
> like signing pubsub items, MUC messages, etc. And, erm, security
> labelling. Because this is signature stuff, X.509 is basically our
> single weapon of choice here - we could do S/MIME, therefore, but
> even the people doing this stuff now aren't using S/MIME.

I think the S/MIME approach really isn't as bad as it is made out to be.  The 
ugliness with RFC 3923 is the fact that you have to convert message content 
to/from that weird email-ish CPIM format.  The crypto part is sane, and we'd 
be hard-pressed to do better.

S/MIME uses the Cryptographic Message Syntax format (RFC 3852, PKCS#7) 
underneath, which can be used to sign/encrypt arbitrary binary blobs.

Here's a pretty good rant of why S/MIME is better than xml-dsig:


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