[Security] About the Firefox 3 Security Dialog & others
melo at simplicidade.org
Sat Aug 23 07:46:24 CDT 2008
On Aug 23, 2008, at 1:18 PM, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
> Am 23.08.2008 um 11:04 schrieb Dirk Meyer:
>> SAS does not work for me when I use bots. It also reduces it to one
>> way removing the option of X.509 certificates which is something I
> I never said SAS should be the only way, we need multiple ways. I
> suggest those:
> * SAS with mnemonics
> * Fingerprint verification
> * CA, but no CA added in the client by default (so the user has to
> trust the CA manually, for example useful in a company so you don't
> have to verify every co-worker)
Exactly. For bots, I personally would create my own CA and tell those
pesky little devils just to trust certificates signed by that.
>>> Having a 32-bit SAS encoded with Mnemonics (like already suggested
>>> here) really sounds like a great idea.
>> Why not encode a key fingerprint with Mnemonics? Looks like the same
>> to the user.
> Only taking 32 bit of the fingerprint and using Mnemonics is
> insecure as this is easy to forge - we already discussed it here.
> BTW: It was argued a lot that ESessions misses a cryptanalysis, but
> if we are going to do extensions to TLS, we might need a
> cryptanalysis for this stuff too. TLS is useless if we add a
> verification method that is insecure.
Well, SAS and SRP are IETF (draft?) extensions. SRP has more than 10
years of field tests and debate (up to current SRP-6, I believe).
They are not "our" extensions. I would prefer not to have any "our"
extensions to TLS.
Mnemonic or base32 encoding of the 32bit challenge, that's just
XMPP ID: melo at simplicidade.org
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