[Standards] XMPP Certificate checking algorithm

Justin Karneges justin-keyword-jabber.093179 at affinix.com
Thu Feb 21 22:45:56 UTC 2008


On Thursday 21 February 2008 1:02 pm, Shumon Huque wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 12:58:03PM -0800, Justin Karneges wrote:
> > On Thursday 21 February 2008 9:49 am, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> > > First let's take Shumon's example of upenn.edu, which resolves via SRV
> > > to jabber.upenn.edu. In this case, the certificate would include an
> > > SRVName of _xmpp.jabber.upenn.edu, which would help the connecting
> > > client (or server) to know that jabber.upenn.edu is the authorized
> > > domain for connecting to the canonical XMPP service at upenn.edu (e.g.,
> > > thus knowing that the DNS SRV lookup did not return poisoned results).
> >
> > This is not my understanding.
> >
> > If I resolve SRV for _xmpp-client._tcp.upenn.edu and receive
> > jabber.attacker.com as a result, and then I connect to
> > jabber.attacker.com and receive a certificate containing SRVName of
> > _xmpp-client.jabber.attacker.com, then I don't see the security
> > improvement.
>
> No, you'd be expecting to see SRVName of _xmpp-client.upenn.edu.

Exactly, which is what I went on to say. :)

-Justin



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