[jdev] self signed cert

DannyD daniel.m.devine at gmail.com
Thu May 5 05:09:55 UTC 2016


They absolutely do.  If you construct your own chain (qualified answer:
strong crypto, valid fields, proper chaining) , from end-to-end with only
certs that you trust and control, you're 100%.

Hard is getting client (with only pinned cert) and server (with only pinned
cert) combo deployed where you need.

Recommend this book:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/1907117040/ref=mp_s_a_1_1?qid=1462424910&sr=8-1&pi=SY200_QL40&keywords=bulletproof+tls&dpPl=1&dpID=41QGf5IVA3L&ref=plSrch

Delivered by drones...
On May 4, 2016 9:53 PM, "Marcel Waldvogel" <marcel.waldvogel at uni-konstanz.de>
wrote:

> But then again, these days, self-signed certs have no advantage over
> CA-signed certs.
>
> Viele Grüsse,
> -Marcel Waldvogel <https://me.uni.kn/marcel.waldvogel>
> (kurz&bündig)
>
> Am 04.05.2016 um 16:05 schrieb Dave Cridland <dave at cridland.net>:
>
>
>
> On 3 May 2016 at 19:10, Tomasz Sterna <tomek at xiaoka.com> wrote:
>
>> W dniu 03.05.2016, wto o godzinie 09∶40 -0700, użytkownik
>> lists at lazygranch.com napisał:
>> > I suspect you wouldn't want s2s to use a self signed cert, so
>> > allowing two level of verification (c2s and s2s) sounds complex. You
>> > fix one thing in software and you break something else.
>>
>> So, why would you allow self-signed on C2S?
>>
>> Why do you want to use encryption in the first place?
>> So, no one is able to read the conversation, right?
>> But self-signed cert does not give you this... Just a false illusion
>> that you are protected from evesdropping.
>> But self-signed does not protect you from man-in-the-middle attack, so
>> basically still anyone able to tap the wire your transmission is going
>> through is able to read it, with just slightly more effort.
>>
>>
> I used to agree with you, but I've changed my mind over the years - it
> turns out that because it forces an attacker to switch from passive
> eavesdropping to active MITM, this is a blocker for the majority of
> attackers, especially opportunistic or mass-surveillance actors.
>
> So a self-signed cert is better than no cert at all (even if you want
> something independently verifiable ideally).
>
>
>>
>> > I noticed the online documentation doesn't completely match the xml,
>> > but there are enough comments in the xml that I could get close to
>> > setting it up. It is just the certs that are confusing.
>>
>> Yeah. The real and up to date source of documentation are the comments
>> in the configuration files.
>>
>>
>> --
>>  /o__
>> (_<^' Practice is the best of all instructors.
>>
>>
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