[Operators] DDoS attacks against jabber.org

Mathieu Pasquet mathieui at mathieui.net
Fri Feb 7 08:54:43 UTC 2014

On Fri, Feb 07, 2014 at 08:05:12AM +0000, David Banes wrote:
> On 6 Feb 2014, at 18:11, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter at stpeter.im> wrote:
> > Folks,
> > 
> > The jabber.org IM service has experienced an ongoing DDoS attack over the last several days. The attack occurs over XMPP (not TCP) and has originated from JabberIDs registered with a broad cross-section of servers on the public XMPP network. As far as we have been able to determine, most of these servers offer In-Band Registration (XEP-0077) with few if any restrictions (such as CAPTCHAs, although we know those are easily thwarted anyway).
> > 
> > The jabber.org admins have taken a number of steps to limit the impact of these DDoS attacks. Unfortunately, among those steps, we have been forced to disable server-to-server communication from the servers that host the accounts that are attacking jabber.org. We really don't like it that legitimate users of these servers are thereby prevented from communicating with users at jabber.org, but at this point we have no choice.
> > 
> > The list of servers we are currently blocking can be found at the end of this message. We will update this list as needed, because we are continuing to discover more servers with DDoS accounts on them.
> > 
> > If you run one of these servers, please let us know when you've added
> > additional protection against registration abuse, along with details about what you've done, so that we can re-enable federation with your server.
> > 
> > Thanks!
> > 
> > Peter (for the jabber.org admin team)
> > 
> > ###
> > 
> > bal-s.ru
> > bks-tv.ru
> > debianforum.de
> > footter.com
> > games.onego.ru
> > im.apinc.org
> > im.hadrien.eu
> > iraqtalk.org
> > jabber.com.ua
> > jabber.fr
> > jabber.mipt.ru
> > jabber.murom.net
> > jabber.nln.ru
> > jabber.no
> > jabber.snc.ru
> > jabber.stream.uz
> > jabber.totel.ru
> > jabber.tsk.ru
> > jabber.wiretrip.org
> > jabber-br.org
> > jabbernet.dk
> > kofeina.net
> > linux.pl
> > octro.net
> > oneteam.im
> > talk.mipt.ru
> > talkers.im
> > zsh.su
> > 
> > ###
> In my view this is the correct approach (block s2s communication) and mirrors the behaviour in the SMTP world. It's the way I run SMTP/XMPP platforms so I'd expect others to do the same. 
> Quite simply if you see a badly behaving server/IP you block it until the owner has rectified the situation.   Yes this upsets some users on the server(s) that is blocked but that's fine, they can apply pressure on the owner to fix it or take their 'business' elsewhere.     
> Doing this will weed out the problem operators and clean up our network.
> David.

The issue here is that there is no real solution. SMTP has been coping
with spam and bad behavior for a long time, and has tools to manage it.
Here, there is simply no good solution for preventing abuse, at least
with ejabberd or prosody.

Captcha is no good for a public service (kills accessibility), SMS
validation is not always easy to deploy and there is a high trust
requirement (at least, I would not be willing to give my number to
subscribe to an IM service), email validation is more or less the same,
additionally with being only a quickfix before the bots are fixed to use
it as well. Disabling IBR is the same, that will work… for the first

And while I am not all for open registration services, I believe they
are necessary if we want normal users to be able to register to a
service without going through a lengthy registration process.

Another point that I believe is not mentioned is that here, jabber.org
is not the only victim of these attacks, and the nature of XMPP makes it
so that the originating service gets also harmed (either in performance
drops, or plain crashs because of too much activity). That is why I find
it quite unfair to behave as if the server admins weren't having a
problem with the rogue activity.

Ultimately, the best thing would first be to have better rate-limiting
tools. It is no silver bullet, but being able to rate-limit outgoing
connections individually and globally would be a great improvement over
what there is today (and mod_limits in prosody is a start in this
Next, it would be having better dedicated admin tools for XEP-0133,
because administrating a server through ad-hoc commands is simply not
sane. Once your server has rate-limiting techiques in place, then the
spammer mostly becomes your problem and only yours, so you can take
more time to fix it. I have developed a small graphical tool for showing
online users, their resources, the country it is connecting from, with
the possibility to delete a set of accounts in one click. However, this
is very incomplete and right now I think a command-line tool would work
better, especially wen managing offline users.

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 836 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://mail.jabber.org/pipermail/operators/attachments/20140207/8419b27a/attachment.pgp>

More information about the Operators mailing list