tor 2024-01-11 klockan 13:39 +0100 skrev Holger Weiß:
* Simon Josefsson <simon(a)josefsson.org>
[2024-01-11 13:10]:
I believe tls-server-end-point is generally best
left unimplemented
to
guide efforts towards supporting the stronger tls-exporter.
One use case I see for tls-server-end-point is that it allows for
supporting channel binding by setups where TLS is terminated by some
reverse proxy, thereby protecting against _some_ but not all attack
vectors that tls-exporter protects against.
Indeed -- however I think the burden to support those kind of
environments should be on the entities chosing to deploy and use those
kind of environments, instead of placing the burden (and weakening
security) for everyone else.
While I think it is acceptable for standards to acknowledge and allow
insecure usage modes (with proper caveats), I believe the primary
purpose and default recommendations for a standard should be to promote
secure behaviour. That is not achieved in XEP-0440 now.
A compromise would be to mandate both tls-exporter and tls-server-end-
point, however I'm hoping the short period that tls-server-end-point
has been mandated can be ignored and we can select a better mandatory
method.
/Simon