[Standards] [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-melnikov-digest-to-historic-00.txt]

Peter Saint-Andre stpeter at stpeter.im
Tue Sep 11 19:15:48 UTC 2007

Ian Paterson wrote:
> Kevin Smith wrote:
>> On 11 Sep 2007, at 17:20, Ian Paterson wrote:
>>> Even where TLS is available, SASL PLAIN requires server operators to
>>> keep copies of all users' passwords. This is a serious (and often
>>> unnecessary) security weakness.
>> I'm not sure that's true; the server could hash the password still,
>> both in storage and at the end of the wire. It doesn't help against a
>> compromised server that's still accepting connections, but the
>> passwords don't need to be stored plaintext afaics.
> Yes, sorry everyone who corrected me. That was my silly error (lack of
> sleep).
> In real life servers will always be compromised (especially in cases
> where the attacker is the service provider). So SASL PLAIN still
> contains a serious vulnerability that is easily fixed in those cases
> where DIGEST-MD5 is a practical option.

Except that DIGEST-MD5 is effectively being deprecated by the IETF. Thus
the interest in SCRAM, YAP, and their ilk.


Peter Saint-Andre

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